Governing Disasters: Embracing Human Rights in a Multi-Level, Multi-Duty Bearer, Disaster Governance Landscape by Lane, Lottie & Hesselman, Marlies
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 93–104
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v5i2.899
Article
Governing Disasters: Embracing Human Rights in a Multi-Level,
Multi-Duty Bearer, Disaster Governance Landscape
Lottie Lane 1,* and Marlies Hesselman 2
1 Groningen Centre for Law and Governance, University of Groningen, 9712 CP Groningen, The Netherlands;
E-Mail: c.l.lane@rug.nl
2 Department of International Law, University of Groningen, 9712 CP Groningen, The Netherlands;
E-Mail: m.m.e.hesselman@rug.nl
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 31 January 2017 | Accepted: 13 March 2017 | Published: 12 May 2017
Abstract
International and national disaster governance faces multiple challenges given the large variety and amounts of resources,
skills and expertise that adequate disaster response commands. Moreover, disasters do not necessarily respect territorial
boundaries, or may overwhelm the capacity of any one nation. They may therefore need a truly collective, joint, or even
global effort to be overcome. Not seldom, reducing disaster risks and responding to disasters as they occur requires a
sustained, concerted and coordinated effort of a broad range of actors, both public and private, acting nationally and in-
ternationally, and across the full ‘disaster cycle’. Unfortunately, disaster governance is commonly characterized as patchy,
fragmented and inadequate, leading to essential protection gaps for affected communities. In order to strengthen disas-
ter governance, this article first aims to further conceptualize the practice and challenges of ‘disaster governance’, mostly
through the lens of ‘Multi-Level Governance’. Secondly, it proposes that disaster governance will greatly benefit from rel-
evant actors more firmly embracing human rights-based approaches, particularly in the context of so-called, emerging
‘multi-duty bearer human rights regimes’.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the huge and protracted im-
pacts on human lives caused by disasters have revealed a
dire need for improved national and international protec-
tion frameworks, and essentially for better disaster gov-
ernance. Yet, research into existing governance frame-
works typically shows that disaster governance archi-
tectures are highly dynamic, complex, multi-level, multi-
actor, and fragmented and patchy in nature. Particularly,
disaster governance takes place amongst a broad range
of public and private actors, at various levels (from the lo-
cal to the global) and involves various types of activities,
in various phases of disaster management (Fisher, 2007;
Gall, Cutter, & Nguyen, 2014, p. 4; International Federa-
tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IRFC], 2000,
2005, 2007, pp. 24, 151; Tierney, 2012).
In recent years, several international initiatives have
sought to improve international and domestic disaster
governance, in particular by clarifying ‘legal standards,
procedures, rights and duties’, or by attempting to ‘pull
together the disparate threads of existing law’ and to
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‘expand and develop the law in new ways’; indeed,
especially in international law, various initiatives have
emerged to develop or clarify the law or to improve the
coordination and synthesis of different regimes (see IFRC,
2000, p. 145, 2007; Inter-Agency Standing Committee
[IASC], 2011; International Law Commission [ILC], 2016;
Sphere Project, 2011).
The outcomeof one important initiative, the ‘Interna-
tional Disaster Response Law’ Programme of the Interna-
tional Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC, 2007), affirmed
the lingering image that disaster governance indeed re-
mains mostly carried out through an amalgam of loosely
related regulatory instruments, policies and processes,
with a ‘yawning gap’ at its core (IFRC, 2000, p. 145, 2007;
Fisher, 2007). In fact, a single glance at the numerous
search categories that organize the IFRC’s Disaster Law
Database—currently containing over 1,300 national, re-
gional and international instruments—shows that instru-
ments pertain to different:
• Types of disasters (e.g. hydrological, meteorologi-
cal, technological, environmental disasters);
• Actors involved (e.g. affected states, assisting
states, transit states, inter-governmental organi-
sations, non-governmental organizations, the pri-
vate sector, individuals);
• Sectors (e.g. telecom, food, water, health, hous-
ing);
• Activities (e.g. rescue, relief, recovery, risk reduc-
tion);
• Or disagree on key terms (e.g. risk, vulnerability,
humanitarian assistance, preparedness).
This has only been partially improved by other recent
initiatives—such as the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event
of Disasters, or the new Sendai Framework on Disaster
Risk Reduction (DRR) (ILC, 2016; United Nations Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], 2015b)—for these
instruments still focus predominantly on certain actors
or certain topics (e.g. on states, disaster relief, or DRR).
The most important problem of such fragmented
and patchy approaches is an unwanted duplication of
efforts or serious gaps in protection, including delays
in the delivery of crucial, life-saving goods and services
to disaster victims, or poor coordination of activities
between pre-, post- and disaster-proper phases (Fisher,
2007; IFRC, 2007; Jones, Oven, Manyena, & Aryal, 2014).
In response to the current inadequacy of disaster gov-
ernance, themain purpose of this article is twofold. First,
it aims to sketch in greater conceptual detail the various
dimensions and challenges of governing disasters (Sec-
tion 2). In particular, we use the Type I and Type II typol-
ogy of ‘Multi-Level Governance’ (MLG) as proposed by
Hooghe and Marks (2004) as a general framework (Sec-
tion 3). The purpose of embedding this article in MLG-
literature is not necessarily to ‘test’, reflect on or add
to MLG-theory as such, but rather to use MLG as oth-
ers have done: as a useful heuristic device to understand
how disaster governance is ‘arranged today in a way that
[is] easy to grasp’ and what challenges might arise from
such arrangements (Stephenson, 2013, p. 818, emphasis
removed). In fact, we are aware that MLG-literature has
been criticized for its lack of engagement with explana-
tions of causality, or with what drives MLG-regimes to
come about in the first place (Stephenson, 2013). While
we acknowledge such concerns and the importance of
asking these questions, certainly as a matter of political
science research, we also emphasize immediately that,
as principally international legal scholars, we intend to
use MLG predominantly in its more descriptive form as
a way of understanding which levels or actors may be
involved in disaster governance and how their activities
may overlap or relate to each other.
On the basis of this conceptual MLG framework, we
embark on the second part of our article, which is an
inquiry into the role of international human rights law
(IHRL) and human rights-based approaches (HRBAs) for
improving disaster governance. Here, the article will ac-
tually argue that HRBAs may be able to remedy some
central criticisms of MLG regimes, notably, the difficulty
of (al)locating material responsibilities among many dif-
ferent actors and levels and, above all, ensuring an ad-
equate measure of answerability and accountability to
affected populations in such complex regimes.
Indeed, IHRL must by now be considered a corner-
stone, if not a key touchstone, for disaster governance
activity. IHRL protects a broad range of disaster-relevant
rights, such as the human rights to water, food, shel-
ter, medical care, adequate housing, social security, in-
surance, information, or the protection of life, homes,
property and physical integrity, in all phases of disaster
management (for a comprehensive analysis of how IHRL
applies to disaster management, see Cubie & Hessel-
man, 2015; Hesselman, 2013). Recent key international
standard-setting initiatives on disaster governance af-
firm the importance of human rights, for example when
they state that ‘[p]ersons affected by disasters are en-
titled to the respect for and protection of their human
rights in accordance with international law’ (ILC, 2016,
Draft Article 5, or IASC, 2011; UNISDR, 2015b, Princi-
ple 19; Sphere Project, 2011; United Nations Human
Rights Council [UNHRC], 2015). In our view, IHRL is an
indispensable, universal reference point for all actors in-
volved in disaster governance, because its relevant pro-
tective standards can help improve the design of disaster
programmes, processes and activities and also provide
affected communities with pertinent yardsticks against
which to assess relevant actors’ behavior in the comple-
tion of their disaster-related activities. The application of
IHRL standards through HRBAs in particular (as explained
in Section 4) will assist in improving the overall account-
ability of all relevant actors as well as the allocation and
distribution of responsibility among diverse actors that
undergirds the possibilities for improved accountability
in the first place. The latter is further underscored by our
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analysis of the present, progressive articulation of inter-
national human rights responsibilities for non-state ac-
tors in IHRL, and the emergence of so-called ‘multi-duty
bearer human rights regimes’ (Section 4.2). At the same
time, these multi-duty bearer regimes are also still de-
veloping, and they may learn from the insights gathered
from the MLG analysis in Section 3.
2. Disaster Governance
Recently, the term ‘disaster governance’ has been de-
fined as:
the interrelated sets of norms, organisational and
institutional actors, and practices (spanning pre-
disaster, trans-disaster, and post-disaster periods)
that are designed to reduce the impacts and losses
associated with disasters….Disaster governance goes
beyond governmental settings, powers, processes
and tools by encouraging collective actions through
the engagement of all stakeholders…operating at all
scales—from local to global. (Gall et al., 2014, p. 4;
Tierney, 2012)
Arguably, the term ‘disaster governance’ is closely re-
lated to, but not entirely synonymous with, the more
familiar term ‘disaster risk governance’. The latter term
is linked to the field of DRR and mostly focuses actors’
attention on the reduction and avoidance of disaster-
related risks in a broad sense—and away from the nar-
rowermanagement of emergency disaster relief (see def-
inition of ‘disaster risk governance’ and DRR by UNISDR
(2015a, 2017).
We do not necessarily prejudice the term ‘disas-
ter governance’ over ‘disaster risk governance’. How-
ever, we affirm the importance—as also stressed by
the definition above—of a holistic, integrated vision of
the activities required in all phases of disasters, includ-
ing disaster risk reduction, preparedness and preven-
tion in pre-disaster phases, emergency response, relief
and search and rescue activity in disaster-proper phases,
and (early) recovery and reconstruction in post-disaster
phases. Such a holistic approach is in line with current
disaster management literature, which commonly em-
braces the concept of the ‘disaster cycle’ (de Lourdes
Melo Zurita, Cook, Harms, & March 2015, p. 386; Far-
ber, 2014; Hesselman, 2013; IASC, 2011, p. 2). At the
same time, the UNISDR (2015a) recently critiqued the
limited definition that many actors attach to the term
‘disaster riskmanagement/governance’, in the sense that
actors seem to focus mostly on mitigating or prepar-
ing for exogenous risks and hazards (e.g. floods, a ty-
phoon, earthquake or mud-slide) or try to improve pre-
paredness for response and relief, instead of also ad-
dressing dire endogenous, structural risk factors in soci-
ety, such as poor financial stability, under-sourced local
governments, poverty in the population, or pre-existing
social conflict (UNISDR, 2015a, pp. 128–129). UNISDR
(2015a, p. 129) even submits that ‘disaster management
cycle’-based governance regimes, carried out through
specialized disaster risk management sectors, may have
reached their limit, because this sector is starting to
share an ‘increasingly crowded space with the climate
change sector, finance and planning ministries, the pri-
vate sector and city governments’. Moreover, ‘manag-
ing risks cannot be separated from the broader gover-
nance of social and economic development’, however, a
new governance paradigm has yet to emerge’ (UNISDR,
2015a, p. 129).
We posit here that, also from this broader gover-
nance perspective, IHRL provides a valuable integrative
governance framework, as it is specifically applicable to
all phases of the disaster cycle and to structural under-
lying risk factors and other fields, such as poverty reduc-
tion, discrimination, social exclusion, or climate change.
Finally, before further considering the characteristics
and challenges of disaster governance through a lens of
MLG, it is useful to point out that a salient challenge of
governing ‘disasters’ continues to be the lack of a single,
authoritative definition of ‘disasters’. For example, (the
causes of) disasters in various legal instruments are iden-
tified as natural, man-made, technological, slow-onset
(e.g. desertification, drought, salinification) or sudden-
onset (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, oil spills), and in
some cases include terrorism or armed conflict (see gen-
erally ILC, 2016; Telesetksy, 2015; Tierney, 2012). Natu-
rally, in order to understand the relevance or applicabil-
ity of certain governance regimes to any particular event
or any set of risk factors, a further understanding of what
a disaster (risk) might entail is important.
3. Multi-Level (Disaster) Governance
3.1. (Disaster) Governance without or beyond States
The general term ‘governance’ canmean different things
and has attracted different definitions in literature de-
pending on the context. For example, governance has
been defined as ‘the attempts of governments or other
actors to steer communities, whole countries, or even
groups of countries in the pursuit of collective goals’ (Bell
& Hindmoor, 2009, p. 1), or as ‘a process whereby soci-
eties or organizationsmake their important decisions, de-
termine whom they involve in the process and how they
render account’ (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 1).
It is a popular notion (both within governance litera-
ture itself and literature pertaining to transnational pol-
icymaking/global public policy, e.g. Stone & Ladi, 2015),
that governance does not equal government. The defini-
tion of disaster governance provided above clearly con-
siders ‘governance’ to go ‘beyond governmental settings,
powers, processes and tools by encouraging collective ac-
tions through the engagement of all stakeholders’ (Gra-
ham et al., 2003; emphasis added). Some governance lit-
erature supports that governance may even take place
without government (e.g. Jones et al., 2014, p. 80; Peters
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& Pierre, 1998, pp. 223–243; Rhodes, 2006; Rosenau &
Czempiel, 1992).
For disaster settings, governance ‘beyond’ or ‘with-
out’ governments is certainly of interest both nation-
ally and internationally. First, hazardous situations will
inmany cases (temporarily) overwhelm state authorities,
especially in countries with scarce resources. Moreover,
affected states may lack the necessary capacity to pre-
vent or respond to disasters altogether, or may not be
in a position to act as first responders (e.g. see Tierney,
2012, p. 351). Aldrich and Meyer (2015, pp. 255–256)
also note that in many disaster settings, individuals such
as neighbors and family members will be the first ac-
tors to respond and ‘provide immediate lifesaving assis-
tance’, and that communities with strong ‘social capital
networks’ tend to rely on formal institutions to a lesser
degree, and have a better chance of adequately respond-
ing to and (swiftly) recovering from disasters (see Aldrich
& Meyer, 2015, pp. 257–258). While a full consideration
of what constitute ‘social capital networks’ is beyond the
scope of this paper, the argument is that high levels of
political, civic, social, religious or family cohesion bolster
disaster resilience due to mutual support in communi-
ties (see Aldrich &Meyer, 2015). In circumstances of gov-
ernance without or beyond government, it is neverthe-
less always important to understand which action non-
state actors may or must take, and whether and which
(direct) responsibilities might exist for various actors. Im-
portantly, which (types of) responsibilities (still) exist for
state actors, in a residual or complementary manner?
On the complexity of locating responsibility when pri-
vate actors are involved, de Lourdes Melo Zurita et al.
(2015) have pointed out in relation to the involvement
of NGOs in Australian disaster response and recovery, for
example, that local NGOs originally focused on ‘filling the
‘gaps’ in services not provided through formal govern-
ment channels’, but that they now increasingly work in
close relation with higher-level government, that funds
and commissions NGO activity. A key question the au-
thors identify is whether closer alignment of NGO ac-
tivity with ‘governmental disaster management objec-
tives’ actually hampers the unique role of NGOs in ‘iden-
tifying and filling government design gaps’ and provid-
ing greater protection to the public? Particularly, has an
actual, unique responsibility for non-state actors them-
selves been substituted by a devolution of state func-
tions to local actors in this instance (de Lourdes Melo Zu-
rita et al., 2015, p. 392)?
Secondly, the scale and complexity of some disas-
ters, and their often exceptionally broad and prolonged
impacts, normally also mean that disasters command
skills and resources at a scale and diversity falling out-
side the scope of any one actor’s capacities and exper-
tise, certainly of (poor) affected states (Tierney, 2012, p.
344). Governing disasters may thus be a truly joint, so-
cietal and international effort in some respects. This is
clear from the fact that inmany cases, international assis-
tance is needed. Suggestions that governments may be-
come entirely absent from (disaster) governance should
be viewed with caution, and seem misleading for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is commonly accepted—certainly as
a matter of international law—that states bear the pri-
mary responsibility for the ‘direction, control, coordina-
tion and supervision of the distribution of disaster relief
and assistance on their territories’, and that states are
typically best placed to assess the various risks, rights and
interests at stake, and to manage and allocate available
resources accordingly (ILC, 2016, Draft Article 10 and
commentary; Jones et al., 2014, p. 80; UNISDR, 2015b).
Moreover, IHRL also clearly views the state as the pri-
mary ‘duty bearer’ for the protection of individuals’ hu-
man rights, including disaster victims, even if such per-
spectives are certainly shifting to include duties for non-
state actors as well (see Section 4; Hesselman & Lane,
2017; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights [CteeESCR], 2000).
Those concernedwith governancewithout or beyond
the state typically observe that state authority and ‘cen-
trality’ is receding in many areas of life, being replaced
by non-state actors with more resources and growing
decision-making power (see e.g. Jones et al., 2014, p.
79). In the disaster context, state authorities may be ac-
tively ‘crowded out’ or ‘replaced’ by non-state actors
when they are not powerful enough to assert their own
authority effectively or when they provide inadequate
protection to the population. In such cases, the ‘gover-
nance gap’ left by ‘weak’ governments may be filled by
others, including a multitude of (internationally-backed)
non-governmental (humanitarian) organizations (NGOs)
(Jones et al., 2014). Tierney recalls Haiti’s nick-name as
the ‘Republic of NGOs’ when reflecting on this coun-
try’s notorious lack of capacity to deal with disasters;
yet, she also immediately submits that Haiti’s disaster
governance is not (fully) served by the hotchpotch of
international NGOs, many of which crowd the country
during emergency phases, but leave when the recovery
period starts and in many instances lack concrete com-
mitment or experience with the country (Tierney, 2012,
p. 351). Similarly, Jones et al. (2014, p. 85) point out
that in Nepal, international donors and NGOs work to-
gether to fill government gaps, and that according to
some international NGOs, ‘if the government’s perfect
there is no need of NGO[s]’. Yet, the authors also note
with some concern that the Nepalese NGO sector is in-
creasingly entrepreneurial, in that ‘everyonewants to try
and get involved’ and get a piece of the funding pie. In
this sense, the Nepalese government needs to compete
for resources with these ‘entrepreneurs’ and may ulti-
mately lack the support to strengthen its overall gover-
nance capacity with the help of international support.
In other situations, states themselves may actually
pro-actively recognize that certain activities are simply
better performed by others (e.g. more cost-effective,
higher quality, in larger volumes) and/or that adequate
protection of disaster victims simply commands re-
sources that it does not possess. In these circumstances,
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states may actively choose to delegate or bestow pub-
lic interest tasks or decision-making power to others
‘upwards’ or ‘downwards’ (i.e. to international or sub-
national governmental authorities), or ‘outwards’ (to na-
tional and international non-state actors) (Jones et al.,
2014; Levi-Faur, 2012). In the field of disaster gover-
nance, this may include delegation, regulation, privatiza-
tion, ‘out-sourcing’, or ‘contracting-out’ of particular ac-
tivities such as first aid, ambulances services, fire brigade
services, contingency stock management, food delivery
or reconstruction of housing (e.g. see de Lourdes Melo
Zurita et al., 2015, p. 392).
3.2. Type I and Type II MLG
Clearly, disaster governance is a multi-layered, multi-
actor affair. The concept ofMLGmay help to further char-
acterize this governance sphere and identify challenges
that it involves. The definition of MLG used through-
out this paper is that offered by the so-called ‘king and
queen of multi-level governance’, Gary Marks and Lies-
bet Hooghe (Stephenson, 2013, p. 818). These scholars
are known for their identification of two types of MLG in
particular (Bache, Bartle, & Flinders, 2016; Bartle, Bache,
& Flinders, 2012; Marks & Hooghe, 2004, pp. 15–17).
First, ‘Type I’MLGviewsMLG-regimes as consisting of
neatly nested, fairly ‘general-purpose’, territorially-based
jurisdictions—i.e. at the international, national and sub-
national levels. In Type I MLG-regimes, individuals are
viewed as situated at the bottom of a set of ‘Russian doll-
like’ jurisdictions that each have a set of non-overlapping
functions, competences andmembers (Marks & Hooghe,
2004, pp. 15–17). To some extent, Type I MLG-regimes
may be concerned with ‘multi-level government’, rather
than ‘multi-level governance’, although by now it is ac-
cepted that within Type I ‘intensified (horizontal) inter-
actions between government and non-governmental ac-
tors’ occur at various levels (Bache et al., 2016, p. 487).
We would argue that in international legal scholarship
there is still a tendency to think mostly in Type I MLG
structures, i.e. with scholars viewing regulation as be-
ing nationally, regionally and internationally layered. At
the same time, international legal scholarship is also
very much concerned with the ‘fragmentation’ of in-
ternational law in various (self-contained) specialized
regimes/jurisdictions, and how this affects a unified reg-
ulatory system of international law.
From this perspective, ‘Type II’ MLG is of interest,
since it firmly rejects the idea of ‘conceiving authority
in neatly defined local, regional, national, and interna-
tional layers’, and favors a conception of MLG-regimes
as built up through a(n infinite) multitude of specialized,
‘task-oriented jurisdictions’, with each jurisdiction con-
sisting of a ‘specific-purpose’ governance community to
which actors can volunteer themselves as participants,
based on their expertise and interests (Bartle et al., 2012;
Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 11). As usefully submitted by
Marks and Hooghe (2004, referring to Ostrom&Ostrom):
In Type IIMLG,multiple, independent jurisdictions ful-
fill distinct functions in which citizens are not served
by ‘the’ government, but by a variety of different pub-
lic service industries….We can then think of the public
sector as being composed of many public service in-
dustries including the police industry, the fire protec-
tion industry, the welfare industry, the health services
industry, the transportation industry, and so on.
Type II MLG thus recognizes ‘specialized jurisdictions’
where public (and private) actors gather to solve par-
ticular problems, without a centralized, overarching au-
thority in charge and capable of exhaustively setting and
delegating all tasks (Marks & Hooghe, 2004; see also
Bartle et al., 2012). It is certainly possible to view ‘dis-
aster governance’ as largely undertaken through inde-
pendently functioning ‘sector-based’ jurisdictions, both
nationally and internationally. May and Williams (1986)
have, for example, relied on the concept of ‘shared gov-
ernance’ when pointing out that in the US distinct (yet
potentially overlapping) disaster governance tasks were
distributed among different public institutions (also see
Tierney, 2012). Similarly, at the international level, the
UN recognized the need for greater coordination be-
tween various disaster sectors, dealing with food, health,
telecom, logistics, etc., and introduced the so-called UN
‘Cluster Approach’ in 2005 (see Figure 1). Through this
‘cluster approach’ specialized international UN or non-
UN organizations were designated as so-called ‘cluster
lead agencies’, which coordinate a broad range of in-
ternational and domestic actors operating with specific
disaster response sectors. Simultaneously, a measure of
general oversight and coordination between sectors was
centralizedwith the UN emergency coordinator andwith
country teams (see Figure 1).
Overall, it can be argued that disaster governance
carries characteristics of both Type I and Type II MLG.
It can be considered to resemble Type I MLG because
disaster management takes place at and includes reg-
ulatory activity on various ‘territorial levels’—i.e. at
global, regional, national and local levels—and also still
relies heavily on (inter)governmental governance. Cer-
tainly, from a perspective of general international law—
at the ‘national/international law frontier’—the territo-
rial, general-purpose jurisdiction of the state remains re-
spected; international law clearly articulates that disas-
ter governance and the protection of persons are pri-
mary ‘duties’ of the affected state (e.g. see ILC, 2016;
UNISDR, 2015b). Even in the absence of international
law, it might be difficult to argue that state authorities
would be able to voluntarily ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ of any
public responsibilities in the area of disaster manage-
ment; there is no ‘choice’ to govern or ‘opt-in’ (or not),
in the way other actors may have this choice (see de
Lourdes Melo Zurita et al., 2015, p. 394; Jones et al.,
2014, p. 80). Indeed, clearly, states are generally prac-
tically involved in disaster management on their territo-
ries, and at (sub)national levels use their general regula-
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Figure 1. Cluster approach to disaster response. Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017).
tory powers to delegate competences and tasks in this
sphere ‘downwards’ to lower level jurisdictions, or ‘out-
wards’ to private actors (see e.g. de Lourdes Melo Zurita
et al., 2015, on Australia). When they are absent from
disaster governance or there is insufficient protection in
place, this is commonly viewed as a failure or weakness
of the state.
At the same time, disaster governance also resem-
bles Type II MLG, in that it is highly reliant on a ‘baroque
patchwork’ of specialized jurisdictions involvingmany dif-
ferent resources, expertise and (non-state) actors, span-
ning or ‘overlaying the nested pattern of Type I jurisdic-
tions’ (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 28). This is visible, for
example, from the UN ‘cluster approach’, and the fact
that disaster governance domestically is also carried out
through various risk management agencies and is often
organized in different sectors.
Regardless of the type of MLG-regimes, a main chal-
lenge of MLG is how to achieve a measure of coordina-
tion and unity of action and purpose in such complex gov-
ernance spheres? The question is arguably even more
pertinent for Type II regimes, and as the governance ac-
tivity of non-state actors increases. Most importantly,
how can the quality of governance be ensured, and a
measure of accountability to the public for governance
failures by different actors be achieved? As submitted
by Bache et al. (2016, p. 489) but also by Stephenson
(2013), MLG scholarship has so far shown (too) little con-
cern for the (negative) implications of such ‘complex and
de-coupled governance processes’ for democratic values
and accountability. Papadopoulos (2007) points out that
MLG’s focus on ‘managerial concerns of performance
and efficiency’ and the increased confederation of ac-
tors in diffuse, task-specific governance networks, with-
out a clear overarching public decision-maker, means
that the overall governance of important public interests
(such as protecting persons in event of disasters) will be-
comedecoupled frompublic (democratic) control and ac-
countability (also Stephenson, 2013, p. 826). When MLG
regimes fail, for example due to the poor articulation of
different (levels of) duties and responsibilities amongst
different actors towards the population concerned—as
seems to be the case in disaster governance—, then the
question is where do affected individuals go to claim bet-
ter disaster management, and on the basis of what?
The following sections posit that by embracing hu-
man rights more firmly in disaster governance, universal
standards are foregrounded which all actors can jointly
use to gear their activity towards the essential protec-
tion of persons. Particularly, through the notion of ‘multi-
duty bearer human rights regimes’, the implications of
human rights law for non-state actors may also be better
understood, and the opportunities for accountability on
the basis of IHRL standards may be improved.
4. Disaster Governance and ‘Human Rights Based
Approaches’
In 2015, the UNHRC considered that the application of
HRBAs to disaster management entails the application of
the following principles, as derived from IHRL:
(i) Direct and intentional linkage to human rights;
(ii) Transparency;
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(iii) Participation and consultation of those affected
and beneficiaries;
(iv) Non-discrimination;
(v) Special attention given to the needs of vulnerable
and marginalized subgroups within the larger set of
beneficiaries;
(vi) Accountability
(UNHRC, 2015, paras. 6-7, 9, 40, 95)
Although no single, conclusive definition of “HRBAs”
exists—the element of transparency is not always in-
cluded, for example (see Vandenhole & Gready, 2014)—
all definitions of HRBAs include at least the five
elements of ‘(intentional) linkage to human rights
standards’/normativity’, ‘non-discrimination’, ‘empower-
ment/vulnerability’, ‘participation’ and ‘accountability’
(Vandenhole & Gready, 2014). Originally, the concept of
HRBAs derives from the field of development cooper-
ation, where it was predominantly aimed at encourag-
ing states and international organizations/agencies to in-
tegrate IHRL standards into their development projects
and programming. A highly detailed and instructive ex-
ample of HRBAs to disaster management by UN agen-
cies can be found in the Training Manual on ‘Human
Rights-BasedApproaches to Programming’ by theUnited
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), setting out step-by-
step how human rights standards, including as clarified
in other important standard-setting initiatives on disas-
termanagement, can be integrated in programmedesign
by UNFPA Country Staff, implementing partners and oth-
ers working in the same field (UNFPA, 2010). TheManual
includes a full module onHRBAs in ‘emergency response’,
which sets out how the abovementioned HRBA princi-
ples can or have been applied in specific case-studies. By
now, HRBAs are commonly advocated to address various
development-related problems, and can supposedly be
applied by various actors, i.e. certainly by international
organizations and NGOs, but also by businesses (see e.g.
Vandenhole & Gready, 2014).
The application of ‘HRBAs’ generally denotes two
things: first, it emphasizes substantive human rights stan-
dards as a distinct way of normatively evaluating the
quality of governance involved; second, it views rele-
vant actors concerned as ‘duty bearers’ with concrete re-
sponsibilities to protect ‘rights holders’. In fact, HRBAs
uniquely serve an operational purpose in that they in-
tend to provide duty bearers with clear standards and
principles for the design, implementation and evaluation
of programmes, projects and activities. Practically speak-
ing, HRBAs require actors to fully understand, respect
and protect applicable human rights of affected human
beings when setting up and implementing new projects
and plans; to engage and consult the disaster-affected or
disaster-prone population through participatory mecha-
nisms; to not discriminate when providing or securing ac-
cess to relevant assistance or in setting up relevant recov-
ery programmes, evacuation plans, zoning laws etc.; and
to actively and continuously identify who is vulnerable,
left out or needs extra help (e.g. rural populations, the
elderly, handicapped, women, children or the poor) (see
also Hesselman, 2013; Hesselman & Lane, 2017; Kälin,
2011). The element of ‘participation’ speaks clearly to
the complaint that MLG regimes may lack ‘poor pres-
ence of citizens’ representation’, as it requires all stake-
holders to engage affected populations in decisions af-
fecting rights (UNHRC, 2015, para. 40(c)). Simply stated,
securing ‘accountability’ requires that fora are identified
or set up through which individuals can require rele-
vant governance actors to be answerable for their de-
cisions and conduct, and hold them to account for (po-
tential) human rights violations, through sanction or re-
ward. At the international level, HRBAs on the basis of
IHRL directly open up recourse to relevant international
accountability and oversight mechanisms with respect
to states (Cubie & Hesselman, 2015; UNHRC, 2015, para.
40(e)). As discussed in Section 4.1, the importance of ac-
countability mechanisms for business actors or NGOs is
acknowledged, but still requires further development. Fi-
nally, ‘transparency’ (in particular access to information)
is linked to and improves the exercise of accountability
by making visible what has been decided, coordinated
or carried out (or not) (UNHRC, 2015, para. 40(f)).
Some limitations of HRBAs must be acknowledged,
however; as further discussed below, IHRL has tradition-
ally focused on states as the sole or primary duty bearer,
and human rights treaties only legally bind these actors.
Moreover, until recently, the interpretation of human
rights standards took place mostly in relation to states’
own behavior and responsibilities/obligations, although
the following paragraphs will demonstrate that this is
changing in some respects. Nevertheless, even themulti-
duty bearer approach (to be outlined in Section 4.2)
would not necessarily envisage obligations for all rele-
vant non-state actors, such as individuals in local com-
munities, for example, who may be first responders or
charged with DRR activity (see earlier mention of Aldrich
& Meyer, 2015). For instance, de Lourdes Melo Zurita
et al. (2015, p. 392) point out that in Australia individ-
ual households may be made responsible for protecting
their property in case of bush fires under a nationally en-
dorsed ‘stay or go’ policy, which raises the difficult but
important question of how this affects the (human rights)
responsibilities of the state for protecting these persons
and their property, especially in case of failures by in-
dividuals or communities to carry out protective tasks;
does this imply or affect human rights responsibility of
these actors, or of states, or both? This could reduce
HRBAs’ ability to ensure accountability and protection
within disaster governance.
In summary, HRBAs may prove a useful tool for a
broad range of governing actors—including non-state ac-
tors such as NGOs or businesses—to ensure that their
activities are jointly geared towards meeting important
public interests, such as protecting persons in times of
disaster. The role of HRBAs in guiding the distribution
of disaster governance responsibilities in a MLG regime
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will be analyzed through the following examination of
human rights responsibilities for non-state actors un-
der HRBAs.
4.1. HRBAs: Human Rights Responsibilities for Non-State
Actors
In essence, ‘HRBAs’ imply that ‘plans, policies and pro-
cesses…are anchored in a system of rights and corre-
sponding obligations established by international law’
(United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, 2006, emphasis added). This of course re-
quires an understanding of the ‘system of rights and
corresponding obligations’ that present IHRL establishes,
whether for states or non-state actors.
Here, it is important to first clarify that traditionally,
IHRL typically places legal obligations on states, and it
considers states the principal international and national
duty bearers. Yet, IHRL has recently been grappling with
the observation that it would become ‘less and less rele-
vant if it fails to adapt to changing realities inwhich States
are no longer the only leading actor’ (Vandenhole & van
Genugten, 2015, p. 1). For this reason, IHRL has been re-
sponding to the challenges posed by non-state actors in
several ways.
First, international human rights treaties have been
evolutively interpreted in a way that states’ duties were
expanded to cover the human rights risks and viola-
tions emanating from non-state actors; more specifically,
states are obliged to ‘protect’ individuals against such
risks and violations within their territory or jurisdiction
(see e.g. European Court of Human Rights, 2008). A great
example of this obligation in the context of disasters is
states’ ‘duty to regulate’ the dangerous or polluting (in-
dustrial) operations of businesses, particularly by setting
up adequate regulatory systems for facilities and oper-
ations involving permits, safety regulations, monitoring
and providing for (criminal) accountability as necessary
(CteeESCR, 2000, paras. 48, 51; European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 2008; Hesselman & Lane, 2017; see gener-
ally Hallo deWolf, 2011, pp. 242–245). IHRL also requires
states to regulate relationships between individuals in-
ter se, e.g. in the sense of safeguarding life or physical
integrity, including as a matter of criminal law, although
this has not gained full attention yet in the area of dis-
aster management (see e.g. European Court of Human
Rights, 1985, 2008, paras. 129–132).
Second, importantly, IHRL has also evolved to articu-
late direct, separate responsibilities for non-state actors
themselves, i.e. alongside those of the state. Here, we do
not speak about an extension of the state’s own obliga-
tions, but of extra (complementary) obligations for oth-
ers (Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015, p. 5).
The evolution of complementary responsibilities
for business particularly occurred through the 2011
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UNHRC, 2011 [UNGPs]). This unique human rights in-
strument, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council,
affirmed in great detail that businesses have their own
human rights responsibilities distinct from states (even
if states also continue to bear their obligation to regu-
late the conduct of businesses). Human rights respon-
sibility for corporations mostly requires businesses ‘to
do no harm’, i.e. to operate in such a manner as not to
interfere with individuals’ existing human rights enjoy-
ment (Hesselman & Lane, 2017; UNHRC, 2011, Guiding
Principle 11). One of the difficulties has been to deter-
mine when this obligation to ‘do no harm’ is triggered
and how it applies exactly in and across business oper-
ations, since businesses are not, and should not, be in-
volved in or made responsible for every aspect of human
life or disaster governance. We therefore see that the
‘business and human rights’ community is currently fur-
ther exploring the (legal) bases and concepts which can
ground businesses’ human rights responsibilities, includ-
ing, for example, ‘human rights in the supply chain’ or
‘(spheres of) influence’ (see e.g. Telesetsky, 2015). Sim-
ilarly, pursuant to the UNGPs, this community is now
concernedwith further pursuing ‘grievancemechanisms’
to improve ‘accountability’ for business-related human
rights violations, as well as exploring a new binding IHRL
treaty on business and human rights (see UNHRC, 2011,
Principles 25–31 on ‘access to remedy’).
A further interesting question is to what extent busi-
nesses or other actors, such as NGOs, also have a human
rights responsibility ‘to do good’, i.e. to positively con-
tribute to improved human rights protection where they
can—e.g. by delivering aid to disaster victims (see Tele-
setsky, 2015). International human rights treaty supervi-
sory bodies have considered in this regard that the role
of the WHO, UNCHR, IFRC, UNICEF, as well as NGOs are
considered of ‘particular importance in relation to disas-
ter relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emer-
gencies’. Moreover:
[w]hile only States are parties to the [International]
Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]
and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with
it, all members of society [including] intergovernmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations, civil soci-
ety organizations, [and] the private business sector—
have responsibilities regarding the realization
of important disaster related human rights (CteeESCR,
2000, para. 42). Yet, the exact scope of positive obliga-
tions is difficult to determine. For example, for NGOs,
there are hardly any further indications for their ex-
pected behavior, save for the practice of self-regulation
(e.g. see Sphere Project, 2011, and an exception in
UNHRC, 2015, para. 40(g)); more discussion in Hessel-
man & Lane, 2017). The UNGPs have been criticized for
not contemplating positive responsibilities at all. In the
absence of clear (legal) responsibilities it may be difficult
to try to hold private actors directly responsible for fail-
ure to contribute to improved human rights protection
in disaster settings, although arguably this is increasingly
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addressed through self-regulatory activity (see for more
discussion, Hesselman & Lane, 2017; cf. Telesetsky, 2015,
on the UN Global Compact). Of course, states’ positive
human rights obligations may lead them to incorporate
horizontal responsibilities (owed between non-state ac-
tors, including between individuals) within domestic dis-
aster law and policies (e.g. duties of care for others in
emergency situations, or duties of healthcare profession-
als to respond to disasters—see e.g. American Nurses As-
sociation, 2010).
Before moving on to consider the emergence of
‘multi-duty bearer human rights regimes’, it is important
to stress again that under no circumstanceswill a state be
able to legally absolve itself of its own legal IHRL respon-
sibilities, by delegation or through the emergence of new
duties for other actors (Vandenhole & van Genugten,
2015). The full responsibility for human rights protection
as committed to under IHRL applies generally and cannot
be replaced, legally delegated or changed through some
type of out-sourcing (see Brownlie, 1994; Lane, 2016;
Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015, p. 5). Instead, regula-
tion by the state, as well as the establishment of any sep-
arate obligations for non-state actors, should be seen as
attempts to try to govern human rights protection better
or more completely/expansively (see Bell & Hindmoor,
2009, p. 150).
4.2. Multi-Duty Bearer Human Rights Frameworks
The concept of ‘multi-duty bearer human rights regimes’
has arisen from concerns regarding the continued rel-
evance and effectiveness of ‘state-centred’ IHRL in the
present age, and it inspires a ‘fundamental re-thinking of
a basic tenet of human rights law’, notably ‘that human
rights obligations are primarily incumbent on the territo-
rial State’ (Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015, p. 1). In
fact, IHRL scholars suggest that ‘[h]uman rights law has
to move beyond territoriality as the main criterion for
assigning human rights obligations’ (Vandenhole & van
Genugten, 2015, p. 1, emphasis added). Yet, the chal-
lenge is then, if duties are not ‘assigned’ on the basis
of (state) ‘territory’, what is the basis for responsibilities
instead? Here, it is useful to point out that IHRL in fact
commonly supports both the concepts ‘territory’ and ‘ju-
risdiction’ as a basis for IHRL obligations, with the term
‘jurisdiction’ normally equated to exercising some type
of ‘effective control’ over a territory, population or indi-
vidual(s) (see De Schutter et al., 2012, pp. 1104–1109;
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1981, paras.
12.1–12.3). Perhaps here, the MLG literature discussed
above can actually offer some inspiration to further con-
ceptualize the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights law,
e.g. as potentially involving both territory and ‘specializa-
tion’, or ‘sphere of influence’, or perhaps ‘effective con-
trol’ over important resources (De Schutter et al., 2012,
p. 1154, e.g. referring to control over technologies). Inspi-
ration from Type I MLG ‘jurisdictions’ in particular might
suggest that human rights obligations can and should
come about at different, nested ‘territorial levels’, along-
side the state’s territorial jurisdiction, e.g. for interna-
tional organizations (such as the UN and its various or-
gans carrying out its work) within their competences. On
the other hand, the notion of Type II MLG jurisdictions
may particularly inspire us to (also) consider how human
rights responsibility can come about in a task-oriented
manner, e.g. as based on unique ‘expertise’, ‘resources’
or ‘skills’ that actors have to offer, within their sphere
of operation, influence or organizational mandate. In
fact, the terms ‘position’, ‘ability’ or ‘capacity’ to assist
are common terms in IHRL underpinning positive IHRL
obligations for states and might be applied to others as
well, such as businesses or NGOs—although across the
board, there is still some difficulty delimiting when ‘ca-
pacities’ may have been exhausted exactly (see De Schut-
ter et al., 2012, pp. 1150–1154; or Telesetsky, 2015, sug-
gesting that companies should assist until the point of
bankruptcy when state authorities cannot address disas-
ters effectively themselves, which seems extreme).
In the ‘multi-duty bearer human rights regimes’ lit-
erature, several criteria or approaches have been sug-
gested to (al)locate human rights responsibilities to/for
non-state actors so far, including when non-state actors’
activities could be considered: ‘relevantly public’ (pub-
licness approach); necessary to offer effective human
rights protection (functional approach); or when they
(risk) adversely affect(ing) humandignity or human rights
(stakeholder approach) (Vandenhole & van Genugten,
2015, p. 4). Following these grounds, most actors cur-
rently involved in disaster management could be consid-
ered relevant human rights duty bearers, and be called
upon to consider IHRL standards and HRBAs seriously in
their activities. In order to expedite the process of artic-
ulating human rights-based responsibility in a multi-duty
bearer setting, and thereby of achieving greater joint
protection of affected populations, this article agrees
with Vandenhole and van Genugten (2015, p. 6) who
support that successful multi-duty bearer regimes may
have to embrace an active role for non-state actors them-
selves in carving out and clarifying their respective hu-
man rights obligations in specific settings. This would
take place through self-regulation or co-regulation, and
could greatly stimulate the legitimacy and acceptabil-
ity of standards ‘and hence the potential abidance by
the rules’ (Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015, p. 6). Al-
though it is beyond the remit of this article to examine ex-
amples of human rights-based self- or co-regulation that
exist already in the area of (sector-based) disaster gov-
ernance (see Hesselman & Lane, 2017), these practices
certainly exist. Some examples include: the ‘Guiding Prin-
ciples for Public–Private Collaboration for Humanitarian
Action’ (prepared jointly by the World Economic Forum
and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2007), the Sphere Project’s ‘Hu-
manitarian Charter and Sphere Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response’ (drafted by international NGOs
and humanitarian organizations; Sphere Project, 2011),
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or ‘Disaster Response: Guidelines for Establishing Effec-
tive Collaboration between Mobile Network Operators
and Government Agencies’, (drafted by GSMA, a telecom
branch organization; GSMA, 2012).
5. Conclusion
MLG theory usefully sheds light on how ‘disaster gov-
ernance’ is currently dispersed at the international, na-
tional and sub-national territorial levels of decision-
making, and is simultaneously fragmented in ‘a baroque
patchwork’ of highly task-specific governance communi-
ties that bring together many different public and pri-
vate actors’ specialized knowledge, expertise and re-
sources (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). This article considered
whether/how better unity of action and purpose could
be achieved in such highly dynamic, multi-level, multi-
actor governance landscapes, including a more coherent
distribution of roles and responsibilities, especially from
a perspective of IHRL and HRBAs.
We observed that IHRL emphasizes the ‘primary role
and responsibility’ of the state in disaster governance
and for human rights protection, but also increasingly
seeks to account for the behavior of non-state actors.
This includes affirming states’ duty to adequately regu-
late risks and violations emanating from non-state ac-
tors. Yet, as governance literature also supports, the
ever-growing participation of non-state actors in (disas-
ter) governance reveals that states cannot provide, con-
trol or command all activities and resources necessary
for adequate protection. Moreover, non-state actor ac-
tivity may impact human rights enjoyment very directly,
both negatively or positively. This raises the pertinent
question of their direct human rights responsibilities,
alongside and distinct from those of states. IHRL has cer-
tainly begun to respond to these concerns, inter alia,
through the concept of ‘multi-duty human rights bearer’
regimes (Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015). The notion
of multi-duty bearer regimes supports that, while an im-
portant regulatory, directive role/task and prerogative
for states always remains—because states’ duties to pro-
tect individuals cannot be abrogated—the delimitation
of grounds for non-state actors’ own responsibilities (in-
cluding during disasters) is firmly underway. We argued
that the (al)location of human rights responsibility could
be highly assisted by improved application of HRBAs
by relevant non-state actors, including through human
rights-based self- or co-regulation (see also Hesselman
& Lane, 2017; Vandenhole & van Genugten, 2015).
Ultimately, those affected by disasters have a right to
benefit from adequate protection through appropriate,
transparent and accountable disaster governance activi-
ties, which requires the concerted action of many differ-
ent actors. This article has argued that adherence to IHRL
in the form of HRBAs by all those involved can greatly
improve the protection of persons through a better ar-
ticulation of roles and responsibilities, and by emphasiz-
ing accountability for universal IHRL standards towards
affected populations as a primary principle of organiza-
tion. Finally, we also hope to have demonstrated, with
an analysis seeking to draw simultaneously from gover-
nance literature and IHRL scholarship, that the field of
‘disaster governance’ is not just a multi-level and multi-
actor affair, but also lends itself to broader multi-, or
inter-disciplinary analysis.
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